

02-30

## Market structure and Policy Issues in Technical Colleges

02 - 30

## Market structure and Policy Issues in Technical Colleges

:  
:

- |    |     |
|----|-----|
| 1. | KDI |
| 2. |     |

1980

가

가

가

가

KDI

“

”

가

가

가

가 .

2002 11





가,

” ”

”

”

, ”

”

(graduates' survey)

DB

가

(output)

가

가

”


”

가

가,

가

가



가 , 가 (M&A) 가  
가 , 가  
가 , 가  
5 ,  
.

•	.....	<b>1</b>
1.	.....	1
2.	.....	2
3.	.....	8
•	.....	11
1.	.....	11
2.	.....	12
3.	.....	14
•	.....	17
1.	.....	17
2.	.....	28
3.	.....	34
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	.....	19
< - 2>	2000	
	.....	20
< - 3>	2000	
	.....	22
< - 4>	2000	
	.....	23
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	.....	25
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•

1.

20  
 1980 16 5 2001 95 3  
 20 5 가 . 4 -  
 가 . 1980  
 41% , 1999 55% .  
 1985 54% 1998  
 98% (< -1> ).  
 1998  
 72 5 . 1998 80 2 1997  
 7 7 가 . 가가  
 . 1999 33.1%  
 1997 29.5% 가  
 .  
 가  
 , 가 가  
 가  
 .  
 1980 50% 가 .  
 가 1990 70%  
 가 1998 66.3% -

2-30% (< -2> ).

가

1980 30.1 2001 61.3 가 가

1980 2.25 2001 -

61.3 가

(< -2> ).

## 2.

가

가 가

3 1995 34 4 7 1990 27 가  
2001 20 8 1995 0.77 2001

0.59 1990 8.3% 2001 44.9% 가

가 가 2000 가 -

< -1>

( : , )

			/ ( )			/ ( )
1980	165,051	402,979	0.41	80,620	115,755	0.70
1985	242,117	931,884	0.26	108,483	201,934	0.54
1990	323,825	1,040,116	0.31	130,670	196,397	0.67
1991	359,049	1,052,140	0.34	141,115	201,107	0.70
1992	404,996	1,070,169	0.38	159,432	211,884	0.75
1993	456,227	1,092,464	0.42	174,964	220,774	0.79
1994	506,806	1,132,437	0.45	197,143	231,617	0.85
1995	569,820	1,187,735	0.48	223,689	253,605	0.88
1996	642,697	1,266,876	0.51	252,868	271,208	0.93
1997	724,741	1,368,461	0.53	276,231	295,739	0.93
1998	801,681	1,477,715	0.54	304,637	312,293	0.98
1999	859,547	1,587,667	0.54	294,250	311,240	0.95
2000	913,273	1,665,398	0.55	294,175	314,410	0.94
2001	952,649	1,729,638	0.55	292,035	316,780	0.92

: , ,

< -2>

( : , )

			/			/
1980	50.3	73.0	0.69	30.1	27.9	1.08
1985	57.2	52.1	1.10	37.8	35.8	1.06
1990	71.8	55.0	1.31	43.9	31.2	1.41
1991	77.3	58.7	1.32	45.1	29.9	1.51
1992	75.3	58.0	1.30	47.5	28.7	1.66
1993	72.5	54.0	1.34	50.6	27.6	1.83
1994	68.8	56.4	1.22	54.1	27.2	1.98
1995	74.2	60.9	1.22	54.9	26.3	2.08
1996	78.2	63.3	1.24	55.8	26.1	2.14
1997	75.5	61.8	1.22	58.1	25.7	2.26
1998	66.3	50.5	1.31	58.0	26.3	2.21
1999	68.1	51.3	1.33	59.2	27.9	2.13
2000	79.4	56.0	1.42	61.1	27.7	2.21
2001	81.0	56.7	1.43	61.3	27.3	2.25

: , ,

(< -3> ).

가  
가

가

가

가

가?

(5 )

1981 51.0% 1995 68.9% 가  
1981 78.9% 1995

64.3%

1981 51.0% 1995 38.9%

15

48.8% 10% 가

(< -4> ).

74.4% (1997 )

가

on-the-job

training

< -3>

( : , )

1980	284,735	342,318	0.83	201,057	0.75	11.4	58.2
1985	306,535	453,018	0.68	276,535	0.76	13.3	60.4
1990	273,134	490,951	0.56	274,150	0.56	8.3	84.0
1991	272,020	457,120	0.60	272,365	0.56	7.8	-
1992	277,079	412,056	0.67	274,677	0.59	8.7	87.5
1993	298,642	410,278	0.73	272,541	0.61	10.3	86.0
1994	307,528	409,683	0.75	263,962	0.62	15.2	88.9
1995	343,799	447,106	0.77	259,133	0.66	19.2	90.9
1996	341,601	464,560	0.74	274,696	0.69	22.0	91.8
1997	336,609	480,086	0.70	273,912	0.69	29.2	91.7
1998	311,560	470,715	0.66	302,416	0.70	35.7	84.7
1999	264,467	445,473	0.59	290,892	0.64	38.5	83.4
2000	220,841	413,091	0.53	291,047	0.61	42.0	88.6
2001	207,930	413,247	0.50	270,393	0.58	44.9	87.9

: , ,

< -4> . . . . .

	1981	1995	1981	1995
1)	78.9	64.3	62.1	63.7
2)	51.0	38.9	50.2	48.8
	51.1	68.9	71.9	71.9

: . (You & Lee, 1999)  
: 1) (5-299 ) / (300 )  
2) (5-299 )  
/ (300 )

가 .  
가 . , 가  
가 . ,  
가  
?



, 가  
· (2002)  
· (2002)

가  
·  
· 2  
· 가  
· 가  
· 가  
· (update) 가  
· 3

1995

, (decile) , (regression)

4

가

가

5

•

# 1.

2000 3 158 , 1995  
 4 161 .  
 132 124  
 256 .  
 가 7 , 1  
 , 8 .  
 7 가 6  
 . 7 ,  
 , , , , ,  
 , 6 , ,  
 , , , .  
 4 1995 4 161  
 KAIST 가 가  
 . 11 ,  
 18 ( 8 , 10 ) , 130  
 . 130 2000  
 114 , 가 2 ( )  
 ) 가  
 . 111 ,  
 20 , 91 . 가  
 2 2000  
 , , , 가  
 20

, 14 — , 가  
, 가 , , 가 , , 가  
, , , , , —  
91 .

가 . ,  
가 , .  
111 13 124  
( ), ( ),  
( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ),  
( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )  
) . ,

, 1 ,  
가 .

가 .  
2000  
1999 . 1999

가 . 1996  
가 2001-1997

가  
, 가

**2.**

, ( , 2002;  
) 2000

가

, 1999, 2000  
1996 1999

2001 ( )  
. 19 2000 1998

가 19

2000

가

2001

4 6 ( , 2001).

( , 1999; , 2000; , 2001)

(2001)

, 1 , 1  
1999  
1996 1999 , , , ,  
(2001)

1996, 1999

( )

(1999)

, , 1 , 1

1999 . 1999  
 (2000) , , ,  
 . 1999 ,  
 , , , , ,  
 , .  
 ,  
 . 1999, 2000 , ,  
 , (1999)  
 19 ,  
 .  
 , / ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 .

**3.**

:  
 .  
 : + + .  
 :  
 : ,  
 ,



2 .

$$: / ( - - ) \times 100.$$

$$: / ( - ) \times 100. \\ ( -27 -7, 8 )$$

$$: / \times 100.$$

$$: ( + ) / \times 100.$$

$$: / \times 100.$$

$$: / \times 100.$$

$$: / \times 100.$$

$$: 1$$

1.

(2002)

1

20%

12% 가

가

4

< -1>

2000

(decile)

20 1

94.3%

29 10

20.1%

(4 )

1 3 17  
 가 5 2 23  
 6  
 25  
 4 가  
 70.9%  
 46.7% 20 1  
 132 88  
 가 13,514  
 9,222 4,008  
 2 45% 4  
 1 3 가  
 4 가  
 < -2>  
 2  
 4

< -1>

2000

( : %, , )

1	94.3	0.0	3	17	0	20	25,187	12,977	-	14,809
2	83.5	0.2	7	17	1	25	14,470	8,582	200	9,895
3	75.9	2.3	5	18	3	26	11,970	9,773	1,107	9,197
4	65.7	27.3	2	16	10	28	7,613	8,852	2,876	6,629
5	59.3	38.1	2	11	9	22	7,152	10,877	4,819	8,060
6	52.9	62.7	1	11	14	26	4,022	5,810	4,993	5,301
7	44.3	76.6	0	7	20	27	-	6,717	4,094	4,774
8	37.6	82.2	0	4	21	25	-	8,580	4,035	4,762
9	29.8	95.6	0	2	26	28	-	3,520	3,982	3,949
10	20.1	98.4	0	1	28	29	-	3,130	4,409	4,018
	70.9	47.8	1	51	44	96	29,341	9,071	4,029	6,971
	46.7	49.0	19	53	88	160	12,681	9,368	3,998	6,808
	54.5	48.6	20	104	132	256	13,514	9,222	4,008	6,869

: 1)

2) 518,585 ( 261,669 , 256,916 )

< -2>

2000

( : %, )

1	38.8	97.5	-	82.5	53	47.0	-	48.5
2	0	90.9	100.0	53.7	47.8	34.7	37.0	40.0
3	0	34.1	100.0	26.5	41.6	35.0	40.1	36.7
4	0	27.8	94.6	35.9	18.4	25.9	24.1	25.0
5	0	3.6	100.0	26.9	20	28.4	30.3	28.2
6	0	18	74.1	45.7	12	15.6	24.0	19.8
7	0	0	46.9	29.8	-	25.8	16.2	19.7
8	0	0	15.3	10.9	-	12.2	23.6	20.3
9	0	0	0.0	0.0	-	5.6	22.3	21.2
10	0	0	0.0	0.0	-	4.0	17.8	17.4
	-	-	-	-	53	37.7	21.5	34.1
	0	0	0.0	0.0	43.1	28.0	21.8	29.3
	10.9	48.2	33.5	38.1	44.2	32.7	21.7	31.1

: 가 .

. ,  
 .  
 , < -3> .  
 1 3,834 가 3,942 ,  
 2,379  
 2/3 .  
 ,  
 가 , 1 5,414  
 10 1,545 .  
 2 25,893 10 2,089  
 가 . (Winston, 1999)  
 1) 28,500 10 1 7,900 1 ,  
 가 .  
 1,691 3,482  
 , 3,001 15%  
 2) 가  
 .  
 ( - )  
 < -4> 가 2,250  
 , 3  
 가 ,

---

1)  
 2) (1999) 6,500 1,200

( : )

1	4,719	5,414	-	5,236	1,985	3,772	-	3,316
2	3,779	4,249	25,893	4,070	1,611	3,699	1,984	2,823
3	3,543	3,883	3,830	3,797	1,595	3,563	3,096	3,063
4	3,161	3,026	3,048	3,041	1,305	3,396	3,271	3,203
5	3,413	2,978	2,657	2,935	1,588	3,300	3,332	3,170
6	4,224	2,701	2,698	2,744	1,484	3,140	3,546	3,298
7	-	2,549	2,295	2,388	-	3,005	3,062	3,041
8	-	2,089	2,339	2,282	-	2,838	2,994	2,958
9	-	1,468	2,185	2,139	-	2,162	2,817	2,775
10	-	1,545	2,089	2,075	-	1,814	2,598	2,577
	6,105	4,299	2,593	3,922	2,262	3,702	3,290	3,528
	3,678	3,400	2,271	3,094	1,622	3,276	2,856	2,770
	3,942	3,834	2,379	3,409	1,691	3,482	3,001	3,058

: 가 .

< -4>

2000

( : , %)

					/			
1	2,734	1,641	-	1920	42.1	69.7	-	63.3
2	2,168	550	23,909	1247	42.6	87.0	7.7	69.4
3	1,948	320	734	733	45.0	91.8	80.8	80.7
4	1,856	-370	-224	-162	41.3	112.2	107.3	105.3
5	1,826	-322	-675	-235	46.5	110.8	125.4	108.0
6	2,740	-439	-848	-554	35.1	116.3	131.4	120.2
7	-	-456	-767	-653	-	117.9	133.4	127.4
8	-	-749	-655	-676	-	135.9	128.0	129.6
9	-	-694	-632	-636	-	147.3	128.9	129.7
10	-	-269	-509	-503	-	117.4	124.4	124.2
	3,843	596	-696	394	37.0	86.1	126.8	90.0
	2,056	124	-585	324	44.1	96.4	125.8	89.5
	2,250	352	-622	351	42.9	90.8	126.2	89.7

: 가 .

가 .  
 (1999) 1 1995 22,300  
 , 10 1,800  
 .3)  
 (Hansmann, 1980; 1990; 1996)  
 (Nonprofit Organization)

(commercial)' ' (donative)' , ' 가  
 가 ,

가 .  
 가

21  
 101  
 58 가 .  
 < -5>  
 1 352 578 가

3) (capital cost)

가 가  
 1 가 가 .

( : )

1	221	1,128	-	897	455	-	455	843	-	843
2	79	637	143	403	341	58	341	537	23,023	569
3	130	615	1,182	501	274	239	273	211	55	208
4	121	287	52	236	176	345	205	114	27	99
5	33	243	51	179	198	209	201	92	23	74
6	105	230	48	134	196	305	253	813	30	404
7	-	194	156	170	159	316	259	71	238	177
8	-	173	75	97	181	292	267	44	24	29
9	-	74	11	15	77	267	255	41	18	19
10	-	46	23	24	93	347	340	13	122	119
	192	651	131	491	334	266	315	530	52	396
	123	510	30	267	241	317	273	288	104	211
	130	578	64	352	286	300	291	405	87	291

: 가 .

( : %)

					(校舍)							
1	68.8	61.8	-	63.6	75.3	62.6	-	65.8	107.5	96.6	-	99.4
2	62.9	58.7	90.0	60.5	64.1	67.5	444.6	66.4	158.9	212.4	1,041.5	191.1
3	64.7	60.3	40.4	61.2	69.5	68.7	51.9	68.7	197.4	169.3	149.9	176.1
4	60.5	53.1	45.1	52.5	65.0	68.0	79.3	69.5	198.6	129.7	272.9	157.6
5	66.5	46.8	37.8	46.2	60.1	63.5	84.4	68.3	222.5	184.5	74.3	160.6
6	67.6	48.4	42.0	45.7	47	59.6	84.9	72.0	107.4	219.7	119.7	165.7
7	-	47.1	38.8	41.8	-	59.2	72.7	67.7	-	145.8	148.4	147.5
8	-	43.7	38.9	40.3	-	52.3	75.3	68.7	-	142.8	149.5	147.6
9	-	28.5	38.9	38.2	-	39.8	77.6	75.2	-	359.4	145.0	158.6
10	-	34.0	37.9	37.8	-	30.4	63.1	62.2	-	106.4	192.3	190.0
	82.9	57.1	40.6	53.9	89.1	65.0	80.6	69.9	119.1	134.6	156.5	139.7
	62.9	53.7	38.7	50.9	66.2	63.8	72.1	67.0	162.6	179.1	153.6	167.2
	65.1	55.3	39.4	52.0	68.0	64.4	74.9	68.1	157.9	157.6	154.6	156.7

: 가 .

< -7>

2000

( : , )

1	3,969	2,697	-	3,022	57.7	46.2	-	49.1
2	2,798	1,613	538	2,120	31.4	42.7	116.6	36.9
3	2,596	1,743	839	1,975	36.0	37.7	10.0	36.9
4	2,249	1,361	1,519	1,458	29.9	39.3	14.6	34.6
5	1,986	1,071	1,152	1,168	32.5	38.6	11.1	33.0
6	2,779	1,558	2,669	2,134	141.4	35.1	12.3	27.9
7	-	947	1,435	1,222	-	36.0	10.2	20.9
8	-	1,093	1,128	1,116	-	28.7	10.5	16.0
9	-	805	1,505	1,448	-	24.2	12.2	13.1
10	-	207	1,108	1,084	-	22.2	8.7	9.2
	5,793	1,819	1,235	1,864	75.1	43.5	10.7	37.5
	2,667	1,638	1,578	1,862	37.3	36.8	11.1	29.0
	3,006	1,723	1,463	1,863	41.4	40.0	11.0	32.1

:

1

1

가

.

130 가 64  
 ,  
 1 405 87  
 286 1 300  
 ,  
 , < -6> < -7>  
 55.3% 39.4% 65.1%,  
 3  
 150%  
 1 3,006 1,723  
 1,463  
 1/4

**2.**

< -8> 가  
 20 , ,  
 , 20%

10 20

가

25

가 2.5

1

1

< -8> 2

가

가

3

가

1

가

가

(signal)

< -8>

2000

OLS ( )

( : , , %, , )

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	49.227*** (29.66)	42.167*** (19.66)	23.542*** (5.47)	22.783*** (4.99)	36.250*** (11.54)	61.861*** (16.84)
	-22.470*** (-14.86)	-18.542*** (-11.21)	-19.967*** (-13.71)	-19.958*** (-12.63)	-20.282*** (-9.92)	-23.433*** (-12.52)
	17.179*** (6.28)	13.716*** (5.06)	29.695*** (9.26)		11.223*** (4.08)	18.144*** (5.84)
	27.405*** (13.53)	26.209*** (13.42)	23.033*** (11.51)	24.364*** (11.64)	22.837*** (9.69)	28.889*** (12.57)
	16.230*** (9.30)	16.513*** (9.89)	13.343*** (7.94)	13.724*** (7.79)	19.502*** (9.83)	17.248*** (8.69)
	2.549*** (8.46)	2.565*** (8.90)	2.640*** (9.43)			
		7.787*** (4.90)				
			8.056*** (6.39)	10.171*** (7.42)		
				2.013*** (5.43)		
				0842 (0.34)		
				12.878*** (3.77)		
					.325*** (5.83)	
					.207*** (4.01)	
					.034 (0.62)	
					.898** (3.40)	
						-.074 (-1.24)
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.7708	0.7903	0.8026	0.7815	0.7992	0.7016
Obs.	253	253	253	233	206	252

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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< -9> 2000 OLS  
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	1	2	3	4	5	6
	60.172*** (21.64)	54.698*** (16.33)	48.480*** (5.35)	45.421*** (4.23)	47.724*** (9.26)	64.128*** (10.17)
	-32.287*** (-10.98)	-28.435*** (-8.99)	-30.057*** (-8.96)	-26.996*** (-6.27)	-23.612*** (-6.20)	-31.971*** (-8.05)
	9.147** (2.91)	7.460* (2.34)	15.145** (2.85)		5.357 (1.52)	9.431* (2.46)
	23.559*** (7.67)	21.997** (7.31)	21.851*** (6.61)	22.420*** (5.95)	17.001*** (4.32)	25.044*** (6.87)
	15.449*** (4.36)	14.733*** (4.31)	14.208*** (3.90)	14.850** (3.69)	18.577*** (4.31)	18.188*** (4.29)
	1.769*** (5.24)	1.864*** (5.71)	1.901*** (5.44)			
		5.288** (2.71)				
			3.423 (1.36)	6.133* (1.94)		
				1.557** (3.42)		
				-3.445 (-0.88)		
				2.387* (2.53)		
					.368*** (3.89)	
					.103 (1.52)	
					.044 (0.65)	
					.667* (2.10)	
						.052 (0.50)
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.7771	0.7939	0.7795	0.7897	0.7327	0.7276
Obs.	84	84	84	64	76	86

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

< -10> 2000 OLS  
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	1	2	3	4	5	6
	27.008*** (7.48)	23.857*** (6.22)	16.844*** (3.71)	16.772** (3.54)	29.337*** (5.41)	60.327*** (15.05)
	-15.241*** (-9.40)	-13.090*** (-7.01)	-15.365*** (-9.79)	-15.828*** (-8.17)	-15.159*** (-4.45)	-16.600*** (-8.42)
	24.344*** (9.88)	24.741*** (10.14)	22.739*** (9.37)	22.935*** (9.17)	25.564*** (8.61)	28.079*** (10.24)
	14.860*** (8.53)	15.614*** (8.90)	13.335*** (7.66)	13.109*** (7.29)	18.551*** (8.70)	15.917*** (8.00)
	9.720*** (7.39)	8.909*** (6.60)	5.698** (3.33)			
		6.180* (2.24)				
			6.554** (3.51)	10.391*** (7.19)		
				1.503 (0.53)		
				5.533 (1.42)		
				6.898 (1.10)		
					.224** (3.10)	
					.257** (2.71)	
					.126 (1.09)	
					1.231* (2.04)	
						-.151* (-2.34)
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.7302	0.7367	0.7477	0.7334	0.7351	0.6473
Obs.	169	169	169	169	130	166

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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1	63.77	24,170	25,730	2,927	56.24	97.04	30.2
2	56.42	23,410	23,970	4,777	49.14	100.00	24.9
3	50.64	27,514	28,218	4,192	50.60	65.50	22.4
4	44.34	26,754	27,421	4,427	48.67	34.49	18.8
5	40.37	25,906	26,990	3,992	48.81	38.62	14.2
6	36.03	25,867	26,130	4,350	45.18	8.28	13.7
7	32.14	26,409	28,505	3,607	49.08	0.00	19.3
8	26.94	26,059	27,423	4,612	47.03	0.00	25.0
9	23.21	26,274	27,330	4,525	45.25	0.00	20.1
10	16.26	24,553	25,610	3,544	41.64	0.00	15.2
	52.88	87,990	91,442	4,029	50.99	100.00	22.3
	30.83	168,926	175,885	3,998	46.70	0.00	21.9
	37.55	256,916	267,327	4,008	48.17	33.33	22.0

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1	3,030	3,267	-237	107.8	134	115	263
2	2,608	3,405	-797	130.6	33	35	261
3	2,740	3,523	-783	128.6	52	22	351
4	2,384	3,034	-649	127.2	57	355	318
5	2,244	3,090	-847	137.7	260	22	357
6	2,279	2,937	-658	128.9	41	25	206
7	2,230	2,803	-573	125.7	13	18	320
8	2,065	2,801	-735	135.6	8	18	198
9	2,257	2,797	-540	123.9	29	25	414
10	1,986	2,402	-416	121.0	20	232	306
	2,593	3,290	-696	126.8	131	52	266
	2,271	2,856	-585	125.8	30	104	317
	2,379	3,001	-622	126.2	64	87	300

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1	42.9	79.1	189.0	1,310.6	14.5
2	39.6	85.4	87.6	1,144.8	10.3
3	41.9	82.6	137.1	3,088.8	13.2
4	37.8	74.0	135.0	1,554.9	11.5
5	40.2	71.2	172.6	1,221.1	8.3
6	39.1	74.4	160.6	1,125.7	9.8
7	38.5	77.1	139.9	1,137.9	10.8
8	39.4	76.0	145.8	1,751.1	14.0
9	39.5	68.2	206.7	1,177.6	10.2
10	36.1	58.3	187.2	1,081.4	7.3
	40.6	80.6	156.5	1,235	10.7
	38.7	72.1	153.6	1,578	11.1
	39.4	74.9	154.6	1,463	11.0


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
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
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	1	2	3	4	5	6
	27.611*** (18.41)	30.601*** (10.01)	10.095*** (2.16)	12.194* (2.51)	20.693*** (4.38)	40.966*** (7.79)
	31.284*** (9.22)	31.053*** (9.14)	28.660*** (8.72)	29.944*** (8.71)	30.072*** (8.10)	31.179*** (8.43)
	18.744*** (8.55)	19.021*** (8.63)	16.341*** (7.55)	16.699*** (7.24)	22.259*** (8.92)	20.178*** (8.60)
	1.86*** (4.35)	1.72*** (3.86)	1.92*** (4.72)			
		-.0007 (-1.12)				
			6.10*** (3.94)	6.93*** (4.24)		
				1.62*** (3.69)		
				-0.973 (-0.38)		
				0.808 (0.30)		
					.228* (2.65)	
					.030 (0.26)	
					.285** (2.88)	
					.001* (1.84)	
						-.124* (-1.73)
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.5697	0.5706	0.6136	0.5841	0.6658	0.5697
Obs.	132	132	132	132	90	128

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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	1	2	3	4	5	6
	60.588 (1.26)	54.765 (1.16)	52.290 (1.18)	46.683 (0.99)	17.179 (0.44)	47.610 (0.93)
	27.088*** (8.25)	26.826*** (8.31)	26.204*** (8.60)	28.111*** (8.83)	26.136*** (7.03)	28.916*** (8.35)
	19.436*** (9.08)	18.961*** (8.97)	18.002*** (8.96)	18.955*** (8.57)	21.136*** (8.28)	20.668*** (8.88)
	2.43*** (3.88)	3.01*** (4.51)	2.37*** (4.08)			
		.001* (2.23)				
			7.02*** (4.39)	7.60*** (4.42)		
				1.21* (1.99)		
				5.56 (0.82)		
				.92 (0.34)		
					.160 (1.51)	
					-.012 (-0.09)	
					.210 (1.65)	
					.002** (2.94)	
						-.066 (-0.95)
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.6813	0.6924	0.7266	0.6952	0.7439	0.6432
Obs.	132	132	132	132	90	128

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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
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
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
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(1997-2001)

OLS

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	1	2	3	4	5
	-9.526* (-2.00)	-9.529* (-2.05)	-11.240* (-2.42)	-0.448 (-0.22)	-11.561* (-2.62)
	-0.477 (-0.11)		2.482 (0.60)	6.077 (1.49)	2.022 (0.50)
	5.985* (2.12)		3.326 (1.22)	5.829* (2.19)	3.064 (1.14)
'96	3.621 (1.54)	4.240* (1.95)	7.117* (2.56)		7.753** (2.99)
'96			10.301** (3.15)	9.307** (2.75)	10.335** (3.17)
'96			-41.465** (-3.58)	-26.279* (-2.53)	-42.392*** (-3.70)
'96			35.954 (0.64)	86.644 (1.59)	
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.0808	0.0402	0.2281	0.1592	0.2354
Obs.	68	68	68	68	68

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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< -17> (1997-2001) OLS  
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	1	2	3	4	5
	-12.527* (-2.46)	-14.020* (-2.76)	-10.110* (-1.92)	-904 (-0.33)	-11.068* (-2.08)
	1.865 (0.39)		1.725 (0.37)	4.044 (0.87)	1.509 (0.33)
	5.424* (1.97)		3.562 (1.23)	6.006* (2.21)	3.249 (1.13)
'96	5.226* (2.04)	6.649** (2.69)	6.425* (2.03)		7.265* (2.48)
'96			10.378* (2.40)	8.826* (2.02)	10.332* (2.40)
'96			-40.912* (-2.13)	-23.604 (-1.34)	-41.633* (-2.18)
'96			42.923 (0.73)	86.455 (1.54)	
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.1152	0.0890	0.1628	0.1183	0.1695
Obs.	65	65	65	65	65

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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(1997-2001)

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	1	2	3	4	5
	-9.180 (-0.04)	99.488 (0.45)	25.561 (0.11)	217.799* (2.15)	-36.488 (-0.15)
	-349.779* (-1.69)		-276.387 (-1.28)	-212.352 (-1.05)	-322.378 (-1.51)
	136.615 (1.02)		129.988 (0.92)	174.572 (1.32)	103.801 (0.74)
'96	143.105 (1.29)	90.239 (0.88)	126.785 (0.88)		190.276 (1.40)
'96			109.902 (0.65)	92.186 (0.55)	113.203 (0.66)
'96			-383.826 (-0.64)	-113.314 (-0.22)	-476.362 (-0.79)
'96			3590.429 (1.24)	4493.395 (1.66)	
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.0405	-0.0034	0.0286	0.0322	0.0203
Obs.	68	68	68	68	68

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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< -19> (1997-2001) OLS  
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	1	2	3	4	5
	-91.215 (-0.36)	-84.785 (-0.34)	3.435 (0.01)	287.221* (2.09)	-83.026 (-0.32)
	-357.161 (-1.52)		-364.826 (-1.53)	-293.360 (-1.26)	-384.373 (-1.61)
	112.959 (0.82)		75.659 (0.51)	151.000 (1.11)	47.382 (0.32)
'96	190.723 (1.49)	189.558 (1.55)	198.058 (1.23)		273.845* (1.81)
'96			231.263 (1.05)	183.438 (0.84)	227.144 (1.02)
'96			-1159.519 (-1.18)	-626.002 (-0.71)	-1224.636 (-1.24)
'96			3873.256 (1.29)	5215.143* (1.86)	
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.0449	0.0212	0.0486	0.0404	0.0379
Obs.	65	65	65	65	65

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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< -20> (1999-1996) OLS  
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	1	2	3	4	5
	-2.313 (-0.02)	13.796 (0.15)	260.540* (2.17)	180.568* (2.17)	261.091* (2.09)
	226.856 (1.33)		312.581* (1.92)	282.253* (1.77)	334.517* (1.97)
	52.745 (0.46)		102.424 (0.92)	78.362 (0.73)	51.871 (0.45)
'96	1.124 (0.03)	8.482 (0.23)	-47.666 (-0.93)		-76.084 (-1.44)
'96			83.748* (2.32)	60.141* (2.36)	92.251* (2.46)
'96			-714.538* (-1.90)	-727.590* (-1.94)	-835.298* (-2.14)
'96			-6068.569** (-3.36)	-6344.371** (-3.56)	
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0092	-0.0076	0.1225	0.1235	0.0479
Obs.	127	127	127	127	127

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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< -21> (1999-1996) OLS  
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	1	2	3	4	5
	889.050*** (5.01)	837.402*** (4.69)	769.987*** (4.14)	228.259* (2.18)	851.154*** (4.67)
	341.684* (1.93)		300.677* (1.73)	217.316 (1.20)	299.109* (1.70)
	212.408* (1.97)		207.626* (1.92)	94.263 (0.87)	203.994* (1.86)
'96	-478.434*** (-5.34)	-415.111*** (-4.79)	-348.782** (-3.46)		-422.218*** (-4.52)
'96			-138.334 (-1.11)	-111.990 (-0.86)	-194.271 (-1.59)
'96			-441.327 (-0.74)	-1013.578* (-1.69)	-278.418 (-0.47)
'96			-3469.605* (-1.82)	-6112.111** (-3.33)	
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.1877	0.1567	0.2260	0.1511	0.2103
Obs.	119	119	119	119	119

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*: p<0.001, \*\*: p<0.01, \*: p<0.1

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1	46.0	55.8	-	53.5	27.3	18.4	-	20.7
2	48.6	49.5	100.0	49.2	13.2	14.3	1.4	13.8
3	52.8	48.2	52.2	49.4	11.3	10.5	3.9	10.5
4	47.1	50.7	61.3	53.8	7.5	8.8	7.5	8.3
5	47.0	53.3	62.5	57.1	7.6	7.3	6.1	6.8
6	66.2	53.1	64.8	61.8	9.7	8.3	7.9	8.0
7	-	48.4	67.3	36.8	-	5.9	7.1	6.9
8	-	56.1	70.8	69.0	-	6.2	7.6	7.4
9	-	71.8	72.5	72.5	-	20.9	8.5	8.6
10	-	29.8	70.8	70.6	-	12.9	8.9	8.9
	53.0	53.9	63.0	58.3	41.7	14.9	6.7	12.0
	48.8	49.8	70.9	60.6	13.1	8.9	8.4	9.3
	49.1	51.7	68.2	59.8	15.9	11.8	7.8	10.3

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1	59.6	62.8	-	62.0	2.5	2.0	-	2.1
2	54.9	56.0	86.5	55.6	1.0	1.4	13.5	1.3
3	57.7	53.3	53.9	54.4	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.6
4	50.2	54.5	62.9	56.8	1.9	1.1	2.1	1.5
5	50.2	56.3	62.8	58.9	1.7	0.7	3.3	1.9
6	68.9	56.3	65.4	63.1	0.8	1.4	3.4	2.8
7	-	51.2	67.2	64.4	-	0.5	3.5	2.9
8	-	57.2	70.8	69.2	-	2.8	3.1	3.0
9	-	76.4	72.7	72.8	-	1.9	2.9	2.9
10	-	38.8	69.9	69.6	-	0.0	5.2	5.2
	70.3	56.0	63.5	61.9	4.3	1.5	3.1	2.3
	54.9	53.7	70.7	62.8	1.1	1.0	3.7	2.5
	56.5	56.7	68.3	62.5	1.4	1.2	3.5	2.4

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2000

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			&	
1	64.3	7.2	64.84	3.2
2	58.7	5.7	59.82	2.1
3	66.9	8.5	67.17	3.8
4	64.7	6.8	64.84	3.5
5	75.6	8.6	74.38	4.4
6	68.7	6.8	69.3	2.2
7	69.7	9.2	70.35	3
8	74.1	7.9	74.07	2.8
9	73.9	10.3	72.37	5.7
10	67.6	7.1	66.6	4.9
	63	6.7	63.5	3.1
	70.9	8.4	70.7	3.7
	68.2	7.8	68.3	3.5

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(Job Search)

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(measurement errors) 가

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	1	2	3	4	5	6
	80.259*** (40.96)	78.588*** (22.03)	87.688*** (13.22)	88.027*** (13.54)	86.303*** (13.30)	82.061*** (37.44)
	-13.701** (-3.57)	-13.547** (-3.51)	-12.476** (-3.14)	-10.147* (-2.52)	-8.884* (-1.97)	-12.397** (-2.73)
	-2.944 (-1.18)	-3.107 (-1.23)	-1.790 (-0.67)	-.907 (-0.33)	-1.329 (-0.44)	-.824 (-0.30)
	.667 (1.37)	.739 (1.46)	.610 (1.24)			
		3.715 (0.53)				
			-2.588 (-1.16)	-2.615 (-1.16)		
				.849* (1.70)		
				3.643 (1.24)		
				-8.465 (-1.74)		
					-.162 (-1.57)	
					-.131 (-0.76)	
					.232* (1.83)	
					1.372* (1.92)	
						-.012 (-0.18)
Adj R2	0.0783	0.0730	0.0808	0.1081	0.1066	0.0554
Obs.	129	129	129	129	89	124

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.1

2000 4

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( : , , %, , )

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	134.211** (2.88)	135.988** (2.90)	134.420** (2.86)	123.930** (2.69)	186.242** (2.89)	35.707 (0.77)
	-9.606* (-2.43)	-9.573* (-2.41)	-9.568* (-2.38)	-7.399* (-1.83)	-6.834 (-1.34)	-8.622* (-1.96)
	-3.181 (-1.16)	-2.878 (-1.03)	-3.108 (-1.04)	-1.970 (-0.64)	1.059 (0.30)	-2.506 (-0.79)
	.451 (0.72)	.314 (0.47)	.449 (0.71)			
		-5.072 (-0.60)				
			-.154 (-0.07)	-.041 (-0.02)		
				.640 (0.99)		
				3.959 (1.07)		
				-7.990 (-1.63)		
					-.070 (-0.55)	
					.123 (0.62)	
					-.020 (-0.12)	
					.857 (1.12)	
						-.015 (-0.19)
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.2500	0.2453	0.2426	0.2620	0.2195	0.2464
Obs.	124	124	124	124	85	124

: ( ) t-value, \*\*\*:p<.001, \*\*:p<.01, \*:p<.1


2000 4 , 1998 ( )  
1998 .

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( : , %)


.	52.2	25244	6.0	29.3	63.2	61.2	81.7	1.74
. .	43.6	3370	8.8	64.7	60.3	58.3	70.6	1.10
.	43.2	11571	8.6	34.7	61.8	63.5	74.2	1.44
가 .	41.6	13322	6.3	31.5	75.3	75.2	99.5	0.05
.	41.4	46467	8.0	37.2	65.8	68.9	54.9	3.56
.	38.2	11205	7.0	31.3	65.1	65.9	93.4	0.43
. .	37.3	12664	7.7	19.3	70.5	69.7	64.0	1.99
. .	36.7	15959	5.1	43.6	59.5	62.3	31.3	6.87
. .	36.5	14276	6.7	26.1	54.1	51.6	72.3	1.47
. .	36.5	3844	11.6	38.6	52.2	48.4	46.4	2.90
.	36.3	19425	9.6	40.6	54.1	53.5	68.9	1.64
. .	35.7	12176	8.7	33.2	63.3	64.7	70.4	1.71
. .	35.1	18912	4.2	36.1	63.4	64.0	7.7	7.92
.	34.5	21482	5.5	37.2	58.7	55.2	19.3	7.57
. .	33.8	8950	4.6	35.3	59.9	60.4	31.5	5.72
. .	33.5	21780	6.1	28.6	71.8	69.5	54.1	2.37
. .	32.4	8151	5.2	43.2	61.6	63.9	18.7	8.48
. .	25.4	2054	3.2	15.6	62.0	56.6	33.0	7.56
. .	24.6	7008	5.2	33.6	58.9	62.5	74.6	3.08

: 가 .  
( : , , 1999.)



=0.1870

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=0.2476

[ -8]

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1.

, 1990  
 가 (proprietary schools)  
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< -1> (1997-98)

	4	2
(for-profit)	216	529
	1,880	218
	631	1,130

: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 1997-98.

1996 (Department of Education) National Center for Education Statistics

가 .7)

7) (accreditation)

(Department of Education)가

1997-98 4 216 , 2 529  
 (< -1> ). 4  
 2  
 .  
 4% , 가  
 . 1991 DeVry Inc.  
 , 1999 40 16  
 가 . 1994 1999  
 5 48  
 . (Ruth, 2001)가 5  
 < -2>, < -3>, < -4> .

< -2> 5

Apollo Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: APOL)	Phoenix, Ariz.	1976	1994	University of Phoenix
Argosy Education Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: ARGY)	Chicago, ILL.	1975	1999	American School of Professional Psychology
DeVry Group, Inc. (NYSE: DV)	Chicago, ILL.	1931	1991	Devry Institute of Technology
Education Management Corporation (NASDAQ: EDMC)	Pittsburgh, Pa.	1962	1996	Art Institutes International
Strayer Education Inc. (NASDAQ: STRA)	Washington, D.C.	1982	1996	Strayer University

300 가

< -3>

5

( : , )

Apollo Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: APOL)	137 ( )	100,000	
Argosy Education Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: ARGY)	17 ( 7 )	5,000	,
DeVry Group, Inc. (NYSE: DV)	19 ( 10 )	50,000	
Education Management Corporation (NASDAQ: EDMC)	20 ( 17 )	20,000	
Strayer Education Inc. (NASDAQ: STRA)	20 ( 3 )	12,500	(Associate Degree)

< -4>

5

Apollo Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: APOL)	Institution of Professional Development Western International University College for Financial Planning	North Central,
Argosy Education Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: ARGY)	University of Sarasota, John Marshall Law School Prime-Tech Institute Ventura Group	North Central, American Psychology Association
DeVry Group, Inc. (NYSE: DV)	Keller Graduate Schools of Management (30 ) Denver Technical College Becker Conviser CPA Review	North Central, Accreditation Board for Engineering Technology
Education Management Corporation (NASDAQ: EDMC)	New York Restaurant School National Center for Paralegal Training	North Central, New England, Southern Association
Strayer Education Inc. (NASDAQ: STRA)		Middle States

2.

(2001)

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-5>

가 . Milton Friedman

(endowment)

(investment capital)

(steakholder)

(stockholder)

(steakholder)

가,

( ),

(accreditation) , , ,  
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(stockholder) .  
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US News & World Report  
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가 가 가  
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	(donors)	
	(endowment)	
	(stakeholders)	(stockholders)
	(prestige)	(profit)
	(discipline)	(market)
	(input)	(output)
		(customer)

: (2001)

(output) , , 8)

8) , DeVry 3,500 13 (

10 가)

10 95%

, (input) ,  
, ,  
, ( )  
, (tenure), , ,  
가 .

### 3. 가

Street) 가가 (Wall  
가

IT(Information Technology), Management

가 ,

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(organizational structure) 가

가  
가

가 .

가

가

Columbia, Cornell, Stanford, New York University, University of Maryland,  
(brand name) e-education

가가 가

가

가

가

(accreditation)

가

가

가

가 . ,

. DeVry (2001)

(faculty)

(turf)

(2001)

가

가

(tenure)

9),

9)

1

16

3

가 ,

가 ,

가 (research university)

가 (tenure)

가 University of Michigan James Duderstadt가 Harvard University Harvard University

(tenure) 가 (tenure)

(tenure) 가 (tenured) 가 (intellectual center)

(tenure) , ,

가 .

가 가 가 가

가 가 가

가 , ,

(Pussar & Turner, 2002)

가 1980 17%, 가 1995 47% 가 15.5% 1980

1980 49% 1995 40%

가 가

Pell Grant, Student Loan, Tax Credit  
1972 Higher Education Act

가

가

(2002)

( , , )

(output) 가

, part-time ,

,

.10)

가 가 ,  
( , , ) 가

< -6> (tenure) ( : %)

	1987	1992	1998
	79	76	67
(Public Research)	86	83	70
(Private Research)	82	73	66
(Public Doctoral)	85	80	68
(Private Doctoral)	72	73	76
(Public Comprehensive)	87	85	82
(Private Comprehensive)	84	79	66
(Private Liberal Arts)	74	71	65
2 (Public 2-year)	69	68	55
	51	43	57

: National Center for Education Statistics, Pussar & Turner(2002)

: tenure tenure track

(medical school) (medical center)  
(public liberal arts), 2 ,

10) community college contract education

. < -6>  
1987 79% 1998 67%  
4 2

(2002)

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,  
(M&A)  
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1997

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,  
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(stakeholder)  
가

가  
(non-distribution constraint)

,  
가  
가

,  
가

(control)

가

가

1

(stockholder)

가

4

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

V.

1. 가

( )

가

1995

가

(accountability)

1996

152

1999

161  
1999

9  
158

가  
24

가

1996

134

가

가

가

가 , 가

가 가 .

가 1999

1,411 ,

9 가 .

가

(performance incentive)

가 가

가 가

가 .

가

가

가 feedback

(information flow) 가 가

가 가 .

가 , 가 가

가

가

가

가

가

가 9

가 9

가 , 가 가 .

가

,

가

(quality control) 가

가

가 가

,

,

(governance)

3 1

(governance structure)가

가 가

161 145

96%가

가

2.

가 .

가 ,

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가?

(World bank, 1997)

가

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community college  
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community college part-time  
community college 35%  
(Kane and Rouse, 1999).

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(<http://www.jinhak.co.kr>)  
(<http://www.kcce.or.kr>)

## **Abstract**

### **Market Structure and Policy Issues in Technical Colleges**

Research in Charge: Ju Ho Lee

Researchers: Young Lee, Seung Bo Kim, Hei-Youn Lee

Technical colleges in Korea have rapidly expanded in line with the transformation of the Korean economy toward more knowledge-based economy. The number of students has increased more than five times in the past twenty years. The size of the first-year student body in technical colleges has recently become almost equivalent to that of four-year universities. Despite the impressive growth, technical colleges in Korea are facing new challenges. We build a comprehensive data set and analyze the market structure of technical colleges. And we attempt to discuss the challenges and policy reform agenda of technical colleges based on solid empirical grounds.

We established the data set on 132 (out of total 158) technical colleges as well as 124 (out of total 161) four-year universities, garnering information on test scores of entering students, educational expenditure per students, educational environments, employment rate of graduates, among others. Empirical findings based on the collected data set are as follows;

First, Technical colleges (most of them are two-year colleges) in Korea are not "second rate" colleges any more. There is one technical college which locates itself on the second decile of all higher education

institutions when ranked by the test scores of entering students. There are also as many as twenty three technical colleges whose entering students are above average in test scores, whereas there are twenty five four-year universities whose entering students are above average in test scores. And, given the high premium of higher educational institutions locating in Seoul area, technical colleges in Seoul turned out to be recruiting students whose test scores are higher than those entering private four-year universities in local areas other than Seoul, if other things are equal.

Second, except for twenty one technical colleges, most technical colleges are "commercial" nonprofit institutions because net tuition (tuition minus scholarship) is higher than expenditure per students. Donation or income from endowment in technical colleges are much smaller than that in four-year universities.

Third, amongst commercial nonprofit higher education institutions, technical colleges which locates in Kyung-Ki Province surrounding Seoul could outcompete four-year colleges in local areas other than Kyung-Ki and Seoul. Also, increase in expenditure per student could raise the ranking of the college in the pecking order among higher education institutions. In addition, high tuition strongly signals better colleges amongst commercial nonprofit colleges in Korea.

Fourth, the hierarchy among technical colleges is strongly affected by the region (there is very high Seoul and Kyung-Ki premium). However, unlike four-year universities, it is affected neither by the size of the college nor by the amount of donation nor by the student-faculty ratio.

Fifth, increase in expenditure per student clearly leads to higher ranking

within the pecking order among technical colleges. This relationship appears to be very robust and to last for many years.

Sixth, job placement rates of graduates of technical colleges are 68.2 percent on average, which is a lot higher than around 50 percent of four-year universities. This might reflect the fact that major mission of Korean technical colleges is to provide the economy with well qualified technical manpower.

Lastly, we could not find empirical evidences on why job placement rates of individual technical colleges differ widely. We suggest that it is attributed to large measurement errors, limitation of job placement rates as good indicator of employment situation of graduates of technical colleges, nonlinear relationship between job placement rates and potential elements that might affect them.

Based on the above empirical findings as well as our evaluation of education policies over technical colleges so far and case studies of U.S. for-profit higher education institutions, we suggest two important policy reform agenda on technical colleges; disclosure of employment situation of graduates of each technical colleges by majors and introduction of for-profit technical colleges.

First, we suggest that graduates' survey should be done annually for every technical colleges by every major. And all the information in employment insurance Data Base could be easily combined to check and complement with the above survey results. We also suggest that these information should be disclosed transparently to the public.

The above suggested policy could play a pivotal role in the quality

control of education in technical colleges by providing the competitive environment for technical colleges, which would hold them accountable to the consumers of education. This policy could also replace the past regulations of the Ministry of Education over inputs in technical colleges such as regulations on the qualifications of professors, number of books in the library, expenditure on laboratories.

Second, we proposed that for-profit technical colleges should be legally allowed in Korea. We noted that many for-profit universities in U.S. are now listed in stock market and very positively evaluated by private investors. We also pointed out the six potential merits of the for-profit technical colleges if they are introduced in the Korean technical education; 1) for-profit technical colleges can finance through stock markets to attract the funds from private investors, 2) high management skills in private enterprises can be introduced to the administration of technical colleges, 3) personnel management of professors could be flexibly adjusted to meet the demands of the market, 4) market disciplines over technical colleges could be fostered through merger and acquisition, 5) governance of technical colleges could become more transparent and accountable because of shareholders' demand, 6) for-profit technical colleges would increase the diversity in higher education through differentiation of their educational services.

We also suggest that existing technical colleges should be allowed to opt for the option to convert into for-profit colleges and that the Ministry of Education should provide neutral environment and confined their role to the quality control through indirect mechanism such as a committee's review over the quality of education in for-profit technical colleges every five year.

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