

00- 17

1980


가

가

가


2000 12









42				20	50
		가 가			가
				100	61
	41			10-29	64
, 30-99		69	500-999		59
					100
	500			가	100
			500		
		가			
126					
		78		58	
				127	가
		58			45
		7.45		5.83	6.67
7.63				6.76	6.08
7.45					
	가 가				가
				가 6.08	가
	가				







가

가

가


가


가

가

가

가





가

<b>I.</b>	.....	1
<b>II.</b>	.....	5
1.	.....	5
2.	.....	16
<b>III.</b>	.....	21
1.	.....	21
2.	.....	28
3.	.....	32
4.	.....	36
5.	.....	55
6.	.....	64
<b>IV.</b>	.....	69
	.....	75
<b>Abstract</b>	.....	77

&lt;	II-1>	.....	6
&lt;	II-2>	.....	9
&lt;	II-3>	.....	10
&lt;	II-4>	.....	12
&lt;	II-5>	.....	12
&lt;	II-6>	(1998 ) .....	13
&lt;	II-7>	.....	15
&lt;	II-8>	(1998) .....	15
&lt;	II-9>	가 .....	16
&lt;	II-10>	.....	17
&lt;	II-11>	.....	18
&lt;	II-12>	.....	18
&lt;	II-13>	.....	19
&lt;	III-1>	가 .....	26
&lt;	III-2>	「 」 「 」 .....	34
&lt;	III-3>	.....	40
&lt;	III-4>	.....	43
&lt;	III-5>	.....	45
&lt;	III-6>	.....	46
&lt;	III-7>	가 .....	47
&lt;	III-8>	50-54 ....	48
&lt;	III-9>	.....	49
&lt;	III-10>	.....	51
&lt;	III-11>	.....	53
&lt;	III-12>	.....	54
&lt;	III-13>	.....	55
&lt;	III-14>	.....	58
&lt;	III-15>	.....	59

&lt; III-16>	.....	60
&lt; III-17>	.....	62
&lt; III-18>	.....	63
&lt; III-19>	.....	64
&lt; III-20>	.....	65
&lt; III-21>	.....	66
&lt; III-22>	.....	66

【 1】	가	.....	7
------	---	-------	---

# I.

. , 1980

가

80

가  
(job mismatch)

가

(overeducation)

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

(human capital)

가가

가가

가

가

가  
가

가

가

20 가  
가

가

가

「

」

「

」

가

. II

가

. III

IV

가

## II.

가

### III

#### 1.

가.

&lt; II-1&gt;

. 1991

'98

가

가

가 &lt; II-1&gt;

가

가

가

가

가 가

가

(+) 가 .  
 가 가  
 가  
 가 .  
 가 가  
 80  
 ,  
 가 가

< II-1 >

( : %)

1991	-0.11	0.72	0.96	0.35
1992	-0.65	0.78	2.46	0.36
1993	-1.09	1.12	1.92	0.27
1994	-0.01	0.57	0.68	0.35
1995	-0.26	0.55	1.07	0.32
1996	-0.14	0.46	1.30	0.39
1997	0.95	-0.02	1.24	0.59
1998	2.04	0.67	-1.47	0.75

: = ( 가 / GDP 가 ) \* 100

: 『 』 『 』



'80

가

,

가

.

가

80

80

81

80

가  
가

,

가

&lt; II-2&gt;

( : %)

1980	41.9	30.0	43.8	64.2
1985	45.8	32.9	44.2	57.3
1990	58.4	45.2	53.9	63.3
1991	61.0	47.2	55.8	65.5
1992	65.3	51.7	59.2	67.4
1993	67.3	54.6	62.0	67.9
1994	68.9	55.8	64.2	69.0
1995	69.7	55.9	64.1	69.6
1996	70.2	54.7	64.1	68.9
1997	70.6	54.3	64.3	68.4
1998	70.8	53.1	63.3	67.9
80-90	48.1	35.4	46.4	60.7
91-98	64.3	50.1	59.1	66.4

&lt; II-3&gt;

가 (1997)

가 1).

---

1) (1997), 『 가 』,



「 」 「 」  
「 」 6  
「 」

가  
가

가  
「 」  
「 」 「 」  
6  
「 」  
「 」  
「 」

가  
2). &lt; II-5&gt;

가

가

가

---

2) (1992), 『 』, . p.60. .

&lt; II-4&gt;

( : , %)

	96	43,273 (4.6)	143,194 (15.1)	547,054 (57.6)	84,115 (8.8)	132,884 (14.0)	950,520 (100)
	97	39,739 (4.5)	121,207 (13.7)	502,509 (56.7)	82,818 (9.3)	140,348 (15.8)	886,621 (100)
	98	34,833 (4.3)	107,229 (13.1)	438,942 (53.7)	82,219 (10.1)	153,900 (18.8)	817,123 (100)
	96	60,479 (11.5)	86,150 (16.4)	303,139 (57.9)	43,396 (8.3)	30,751 (5.9)	523,915 (100)
	97	49,290 (10.1)	73,000 (14.9)	293,812 (59.9)	45,297 (9.2)	28,745 (5.9)	490,144 (100)
	98	45,488 (10.6)	64,970 (15.2)	244,773 (57.2)	42,762 (10.0)	29,947 (7.0)	427,940 (100)

) ( ), 「 」

&lt; II-5&gt;

( : %)

	96	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.0	1.3	2.2
	97	2.4	2.3	2.5	1.7	1.3	2.1
	98	3.0	2.6	2.8	2.1	1.5	2.4
	96	3.3	3.5	3.4	2.5	1.8	3.2
	97	3.0	3.0	3.6	2.5	1.6	3.1
	98	4.0	4.1	3.6	2.4	2.0	3.4

: 1)

2) ( ), 「 」, 「 」

< II-6 >

가

가

가

가

< II-6 >

(1998 )

( : %)

	11.5	9.0	7.7	5.8	3.7	3.4	4.0	4.6	3.1	7.4
	10.4	8.2	5.5	2.5	1.2	0.1	0.6	0.1	2.0	0.1
	17.2	21.8	14.6	18.0	12.0	10.3	15.1	7.7	16.3	12.9
	0.9	1.6	2.5	1.7	2.4	1.2	2.4	0.7	1.6	0.7
,	3.8	3.0	2.3	1.9	1.3	1.0	0.4	0.7	0.5	1.0
	25.7	22.7	34.4	32.3	44.2	33.7	49.1	43.1	42.0	31.8
	28.8	15.5	30.3	19.0	29.0	19.1	26.0	17.6	31.9	22.5
,	1.5	18.0	1.0	17.8	0.9	26.4	0.3	22.3	0.7	20.4
	0.1	0.1	1.6	1.1	5.3	4.8	2.2	3.2	1.8	3.2
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

: (1998), 「

」

3)(1993)

3) (1993), 『

』,

p.28.



< II-9 > , 가 가

< II-7 >

( : %)

	98		97	
7,8	1.04	0.76	3.88	2.31
	0.73	0.50	1.43	1.11
	0.85	0.58	3.26	1.99
	1.30	1.01	4.03	2.25
	2.64	2.20	12.58	7.13

: (1998), 「 」

< II-8 >

(1998)

( : , %)

	1,331	1,664	104	168
	(3.3)	(1.8)	(1.4)	(7.7)
	34,444	70,233	4,686	1180
	(86.7)	(77.9)	(63.5)	(54.0)
	3,958	18,244	2,586	837
	(10.0)	(20.2)	(35.1)	(38.3)
	39,733	90,141	7,376	2185
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

: (1998), 「 」, 「1995 」

가 가

가 , , ,  
 , 가  
 가 4).

< II-9> 가

	가 (741)	가 (741)	가 (741)	가 (741)
	(832)	(832)	(832)	(832)
	(828)	(828)	가 (815)	(828)
	(743)	(721)	(816)	가 (815)
	(723)	(724)	(724)	(724)
	(724)	(723)	(723)	(724)
	가 (812)	가 (812)	가 (812)	(723)

2.

< II-10>

10.9%, 12.1%  
 4) 98 (3.45),  
 (2.22), (2.17), (2.08), (1.64),  
 (1.38)  
 . 0 %



35.3%, 13.2% . 43.1%  
60%

. &lt; II-12&gt;

80%

&lt; II-11&gt;

	51.4	43.1	60.0
	13.2	16.0	23.0
	35.4	40.8	17.0

: (1994), Sicherman(1991), Alba -Ramirez(1993)

&lt; II-12&gt;

( : %)

		2.7	14.0	57.2	26.1	100
		3.1	15.7	56.5	24.7	100
		3.6	14.2	65.6	16.7	100
		4.7	18.3	65.6	16.7	100
		0.0	10.1	51.8	38.0	100
		2.4	13.8	56.7	27.1	100
		5.5	20.3	57.9	16.3	100
		2.9	14.8	56.9	25.4	100

: (1999), 「 」

&lt; II-13&gt;

가 37.9% 가  
 37.3%  
 가

&lt; II-13&gt;

( : %)

		41.9	35.5	4.7	10.1	7.5	0.1
		33.5	39.3	3.0	13.0	10.6	0.5
		37.0	36.7	6.0	9.4	10.4	0.4
		40.2	36.5	4.3	11.4	7.5	0.2
		35.2	38.6	2.9	12.1	10.5	0.8
		36.7	38.5	3.9	11.2	9.3	0.5
		44.9	30.8	4.2	12.8	7.1	0.1
		37.9	37.3	3.9	11.5	9.0	0.4

: (1999), 「 」



### III.

(overeducation)  
가 .

#### 1.

가 .  
, ,  
(attained education)  
(required education)  
가 가 .  
, ,  
가  
?  
가

가



가

가?

'(overeducation)  
가

Becker Schultz

(Human capital)

가

(screening theory)

가

(signal)

(credentials)

가

(job competition)

가

Thurow



, 80

(job mismatch)

가

가

가

(normal good)가

가 가

가

가

가

&lt; -1&gt;

가

8).

---

8) (1996), 「

」, 『

』,

p.117

&lt; III-1&gt;

가

( : %)

	가			18-21	22-25
	15 - 24				
	65.4	68.2	62.6	34.7	20.7
	70.5	74.6	66.1	25.8	9.3
	52.1	56.1	47.8	10.6	17.0
OECD	51.5	56.8	46.2	-	-
	34.4	28.2	39.8	34.1	16.3

: OECD(1998), Employment Outlook,

OECD(1997), Education at a glance: OECD Indicators

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가 ( )  
(mobility)

Spence

가  
Thurow

가 가

가 Tsang (1991)<sup>9)</sup>  
가

Alfonso Alba-Ramirez  
(turnover)

10).

---

9) Mun. C. Tsang, Russell W. Schooling, and Henry. M. Levin(1991),  
10)

2.

가.

(1994), (1994) 가  
 (1982, 1983), (1996) 11).  
 60-70 가 ,  
 , 80 가  
 가

4

가 (1987-1991)

GED

---

(signal)

가

11) (1982,1983), 「 가 I-II」, 『  
 』,  
 (1994), 『 』,  
 (1996), 『 』,  
 (1994), 『 (I)』, , 17 2 .

25.2%

가

가

가

가 1993

(job mismatch)

Alba-Ramirez

35.4%,

51.4%,

13.2%

30 가 가

가

가

가

가

가

Tsang, Mun C(1991)<sup>12)</sup>, Alfonso  
 Alba-Ramirez(1993)<sup>13)</sup>, Russell W. Rumberger(1987)<sup>14)</sup>

Tsang 가  
 가 가 1,500  
 가 ( 가  
 ) 57%  
 ( 가  
 ) 27% 가

---

12) Mun. C. Tsang, Russell W. Schooling, and Henry. M. Levin(1991), "The Impact of surplus on worker productivity", Industrial relations, vol. 30, no.2 spring.

13) Alfonso Alba-Ramirez(1993), Mismatch in the Spanish Labor Market - education? The Journal of Human Resources. Spring.

14)

가

Alfonso Alba-Ramirez 가

가

가

Russell W. Rumberger 1,500

(Surplus schooling) 가

가 5%

가 10% 가

7%가 가 6%,

가

가 가  
가

3.

(objective)

(subjective)

(general educational development: GED)<sup>15)</sup>

가

가

400,000

「

(: )」

「1995

(: )」

(3 )

15) GED

가 6 6  
가 1 6  
2 6 9 , 3 9 12 ,  
4 12 14 , 5 14 16 ,  
6 16 가

(merge) 「 」 「 」 GED  
「 」 「 」  
(4 )  
7 「 」 GED  
「 」 가 「 」 7  
가 「 」  
&lt; 가 「  
III-2&gt; 131 ( )  
「 」 7 97.1%  
131 GED 가 「 」 GED  
「 」  
가 「 」  
212( , , 가), 213( 가),  
222( 가), 231( ), 242( 가)  
. 103 5 「 」  
&lt; III-2&gt;  
. 16),  
383,456 「 」 , , ,  
「 」 , 가

---

16) 614( ) 50%  
47.1% 가 가  
가 .

&lt; III-2&gt; 「 」 「 」

( : %)

<b>121</b>	5 (100)	5 (79.4)	<b>343</b>	3 (99.7)	5 (67.7)	<b>734</b>	3 (99.5)	3 (73.8)
<b>122</b>	5 (95.2)	5 (75.6)	<b>344</b>	5 (100)	3 (100)	<b>741</b>	3 (97.2)	3 (50.9)
<b>123</b>	4 (99.8)	5 (70.0)	<b>346</b>	3 (100)	5 (92.3)	<b>742</b>	3 (98.6)	3 (43.8)
<b>131</b>	3 (97.1)	5 (56.3)	<b>347</b>	3 (98.3)	5 (64.8)	<b>743</b>	3 (99.2)	3 (49.9)
<b>211</b>	5 (100)	5 (97.8)	<b>348</b>	4 (100)	4 (50.0)	<b>744</b>	3 (98.1)	2 (40.6)
<b>212</b>	5 (100)	5 (94.3)	<b>411</b>	3 (99.8)	3 (51.7)	<b>811</b>	3 (98.1)	1 (37.4)
<b>213</b>	5 (100)	5 (86.1)	<b>412</b>	3 (99.7)	5 (52.1)	<b>812</b>	3 (98.3)	3 (71.6)
<b>214</b>	5 (99.9)	5 (91.4)	<b>413</b>	3 (99.7)	3 (47.5)	<b>813</b>	2 (97.3)	3 (57.4)
<b>221</b>	5 (90.8)	5 (92.1)	<b>414</b>	5 (95.3)	3 (50.9)	<b>814</b>	3 (95.3)	3 (65.1)
<b>222</b>	5 (100)	5 (99.1)	<b>419</b>	3 (100)	3 (42.3)	<b>815</b>	2 (97.2)	3 (67.5)
<b>223</b>	5 (100)	4 (80.9)	<b>421</b>	4 (99.6)	3 (66.7)	<b>816</b>	3 (99.9)	3 (68.1)
<b>231</b>	5 (100)	5 (99.6)	<b>422</b>	3 (99.9)	3 (54.0)	<b>821</b>	3 (98.3)	3 (64.4)
<b>232</b>	5 (100)	5 (97.2)	<b>511</b>	3 (99.2)	5 (66.0)	<b>822</b>	2 (95.9)	3 (76.3)
<b>233</b>	4 (98.4)	5 (50.4)	<b>512</b>	2 (99.8)	3 (39.6)	<b>823</b>	3 (98.4)	3 (70.4)
<b>234</b>	5 (100)	5 (100)	<b>513</b>	3 (99.8)	3 (85.0)	<b>824</b>	2 (90.7)	3 (39.2)
<b>235</b>	3 (92.0)	5 (86.0)	<b>514</b>	2 (96.6)	3 (59.4)	<b>825</b>	2 (97.8)	3 (73.1)
<b>241</b>	5 (99.4)	5 (93.5)	<b>516</b>	2 (99.6)	3 (66.0)	<b>826</b>	3 (98.2)	3 (55.8)
<b>242</b>	5 (97.9)	5 (89.6)	<b>521</b>	3 (100)	1 (50.0)	<b>827</b>	3 (95.7)	3 (65.4)
<b>243</b>	4 (97.9)	5 (85.0)	<b>522</b>	3 (99.8)	3 (81.5)	<b>828</b>	2 (99.1)	3 (80.4)
<b>244</b>	5 (100)	5 (82.6)	<b>523</b>	2 (90.7)	3 (72.1)	<b>829</b>	2 (99.3)	3 (62.1)
<b>245</b>	3 (98.3)	5 (88.9)	<b>611</b>	3 (96.2)	3 (48.8)	<b>831</b>	3 (99.3)	3 (55.4)
<b>246</b>	5 (100)	5 (76.9)	<b>612</b>	3 (96.8)	3 (47.9)	<b>832</b>	2 (100)	3 (58.2)
<b>311</b>	4 (99.7)	4 (46.4)	<b>614</b>	2 (50.0)	5 (85.3)	<b>833</b>	3 (98.8)	3 (62.8)
<b>312</b>	4 (100)	4 (47.4)	<b>615</b>	2 (68.4)	2 (100)	<b>834</b>	3 (98.9)	3 (69.3)
<b>313</b>	4 (99.2)	4 (64.3)	<b>711</b>	2 (99.7)	1 (44.9)	<b>911</b>	2 (66.7)	3 (100)
<b>314</b>	4 (97.0)	3 (52.1)	<b>712</b>	2 (99.4)	3 (50.1)	<b>912</b>	2 (100)	3 (50.0)
<b>315</b>	5 (98.3)	3 (47.3)	<b>713</b>	3 (96.8)	3 (62.8)	<b>913</b>	2 (99.9)	1 (42.9)
<b>321</b>	4 (71.2)	5 (36.5)	<b>714</b>	2 (99.5)	3 (55.2)	<b>914</b>	2 (99.9)	3 (38.2)
<b>322</b>	4 (99.2)	4 (66.5)	<b>721</b>	2 (99.4)	3 (64.4)	<b>915</b>	3 (99.9)	3 (50.2)
<b>323</b>	4 (100)	4 (92.0)	<b>722</b>	3 (99.6)	3 (66.4)	<b>916</b>	3 (99.9)	2 (47.7)
<b>324</b>	4 (100)	3 (100)	<b>723</b>	3 (99.8)	3 (69.9)	<b>921</b>	1 (92.9)	3 (75.0)
<b>334</b>	3 (99.6)	5 (54.7)	<b>724</b>	4 (98.6)	3 (72.4)	<b>931</b>	2 (100)	3 (46.9)
<b>341</b>	3 (99.4)	5 (71.4)	<b>731</b>	2 (93.6)	3 (51.6)	<b>932</b>	2 (100)	3 (47.9)
<b>342</b>	4 (98.7)	5 (61.7)	<b>732</b>	2 (97.9)	3 (51.3)	<b>933</b>	1 (99.0)	2 (29.3)
			<b>733</b>	2 (83.3)	3 (36.7)			

: ( )



( )  
)  
347( )  
3 ( )

121

5(

가

가)

)  
가  
가  
가  
315 ( )  
가  
가  
6-9

4.

「 」 「 」 「 」 「 」  
가

가.

Alba-Ramirez가

가

(deficit)

(surplus)

< -3>  
 35.5% ,  
 45.0, 19.5% .  
 35.4%, 51.4%, 13.2%  
 6.4% 6.3%  
 가  
 가 26.0%, 74.0% .18)  
 가  
 가 19),


---

18) 가 가  
 19) 「 」 가 「 」  
 「 」 1  
 가 < 1> GED  
 900 「 」 7

가 21-30 가 가  
가 31-35 가 가  
가 31-35 가 80 가  
. 80 가  
가

Alba-Ramirez

가  
30  
, 30-40 가  
53.9% 가  
54.5% 26 -40  
46  
가



&lt; III-3&gt;

( : %)

N=383,456				
		45.0	35.5	19.5
		45.1	38.5	16.4
		44.7	27.1	28.2
		1.2	0.0	98.8
		45.6	1.1	53.3
		53.8	31.0	15.2
		26.6	54.5	18.9
		46.1	53.9	0.0
	20	45.1	27.8	27.1
	21 25	46.2	37.5	16.3
	26 30	46.5	42.7	10.9
	31 35	44.2	45.3	10.5
	36 40	45.2	38.4	16.4
	41 45	45.8	29.7	24.5
	46 50	43.9	22.5	33.7
	51 55	41.4	18.1	40.5
	56	42.1	11.8	46.0
	10 29	44.1	29.3	26.6
	30 99	44.2	30.7	25.0
	100 299	45.7	33.6	20.7
	300 499	45.7	36.5	17.8
	500 999	44.6	37.8	17.6
		56.2	26.3	17.5
		41.9	48.5	9.6
	.	47.5	14.0	38.5
		39.1	34.1	26.8
		32.3	16.4	51.4
		42.2	37.1	20.7
	가	45.9	30.4	23.7
		47.5	35.0	17.5
	.	40.1	44.7	15.2
	.	50.1	30.6	19.3
	.	63.7	18.2	18.1
		34.1	47.9	18.0
	1	43.6	36.1	20.3
	1 5	45.3	37.0	17.6
	6 10	43.9	38.1	18.0
	10	46.1	29.8	24.1

10

가

6-10

가  
가

1-5

가

20).

가

&lt; -4&gt;

( + )

98 「 」

473

&lt; -3&gt;

260

213

21)22).

가 190

---

20)

21)

가 10

가

2)

, 가

「 」

가 70 7 가  
 . 26 -30 가 50 , 31-35 가 45 ,  
 36-40 가 42 20  
 50 .

가 가  
 가 .  
 100 , 61 ,  
 41 . 10-29 64  
 , 30-99 69 500-999 59  
 500 가 100

500  
 500  
 23).  
 가  
 ,  
 126 78 , 58 .  
 , 58 , . 127 가  
 , 45 .

---

22) 「 」 1998 19,994

710 390 , 900

23) 가 , 46 , , , 99

&lt; III-4&gt;

( : )

					( + )
		<b>2,128,208</b>	<b>1,678,919</b>	<b>922,223</b>	<b>2,557,900</b>
	20	63,613	39,230	38,186	77,416
	21-25	287,303	233,315	101,019	334,334
	26-30	436,247	400,385	101,831	502,217
	31-35	356,349	365,151	85,033	450,183
	36-40	346,530	294,267	125,596	419,863
	41-45	246,866	159,859	132,056	291,915
	46-50	163,437	83,713	125,533	209,245
	51-55	104,994	45,896	102,684	148,580
	56	122,251	34,373	133,635	168,007
		1,560,049	1,329,773	566,199	1,895,972
		569,196	344,718	359,415	704,133
		2,785	0	234,587	234,587
		252,048	6,088	294,882	300,970
		1,213,396	698,720	342,743	1,041,463
		148,329	303,788	105,160	408,949
		519,012	607,811	0	607,811
	10-29	509,485	338,186	306,709	644,896
	30-99	545,403	379,309	308,920	688,229
	100-299	441,551	324,715	199,769	524,484
	300-499	143,408	114,664	56,040	170,704
	500-999	473,386	400,740	187,064	587,804
		736,939	345,116	230,190	575,306
		565,477	654,568	129,637	784,205
	.	2,129	629	1,725	2,354
		805,689	704,055	553,196	1,257,251
		5,374	2,728	8,552	11,281
		852,334	749,928	418,881	1,168,809
	가	21,987	14,553	11,336	25,889
		125,768	92,555	46,413	138,968
	.	385,236	429,263	145,790	575,052
	.	451,746	276,506	174,299	450,806
	.	251,090	71,594	71,205	142,799
		41,678	58,581	21,952	80,533
	1	914	757	425	1,182
	1-5	153,532	125,332	59,747	185,080
	6-10	138,299	119,923	56,615	176,538
	10	1,878,705	1,212,583	982,516	2,195,100

24). 가

7.45 , 5.83 , 6.67 , 7.63 , 7.02  
 6.76 , 6.08 7.45  
 가 가  
 가  
 가 6.08 가 가

25).

<  
 -5>  
 가 가 가  
 가 가 가  
 가 가 가  
 가 가 가  
 가 가 가

24) 가 (1992),

25) Alba-Ramirez 13.3 ,  
 13.8 , 7.6

26) (-) 가

< -6>

< III-5>

( : %)

		1	1-2	3-4	5-9	10
(N=172,651)	1	0.37	1.21	1.26	2.59	4.72
	1-2	0.12	1.77	2.86	8.02	9.1
	3-4	0.02	0.23	1.49	6.79	8.54
	5-9	0	0.01	0.14	4.87	18.57
	10	0	0	0	0.1	27.22
(N=136,071)	1	0.56	1.56	1.45	2.83	4.27
	1-2	0.13	2.16	3.3	9.62	7.5
	3-4	0.01	0.18	1.83	8.44	7.31
	5-9	0	0.02	0.19	5.4	19.93
	10	0	0	0	0.16	23.15
(N=74,734)	1	0.4	1.4	0.78	1.3	7.03
	1-2	0.06	1.96	2.57	3.71	11.47
	3-4	0	0.07	1.31	3.74	9.82
	5-9	0	0	0.04	3.13	18.95
	10	0	0	0	0.02	32.23

< -6>

(turnover)

(job matching)  
Sicherman

가

27).

가

가

&lt; III-6&gt;

( : %)

	0.62	63.77	35.72
	0.69	66.21	33.1
	0.19	60.77	39.03

&lt; -7&gt;

. &lt; -7&gt;

가

20-24

1

0.4 5

가

$0.4 \times 5 = 2.0$  28).

27) Sicherman(1991), " education" in the labor market, Journal of labor economic. vol.9. no.2.

28) ~



&lt; III-8&gt; 50-54

( : %)

	10-29	30-99	100-299	300-499	500	
	10.6	11.3	11.9	9.9	13.0	11.8
	8.2	9.0	9.1	13.3	14.9	12.3
	6.4	7.6	9.5	12.9	13.8	11.4

가

500

29)

가

&lt; III-9&gt;

29)

가

1998

< III-9 >

가

47.9% 47.1%

19.4%

71%

47%

45.1%

63%

< III-9 >

( : %)

		47.9	52.1	-
		54.9	45.1	-
		29.2	70.8	-
		19.4	51.7	28.9
		29.6	62.8	7.6
		14.9	46.8	38.2
		47.1	41.3	11.7
		35.4	56.3	8.3
		52.6	34.2	13.2

100 71

가

가

가

2

가

가 가

가 가

가

&lt; III-11&gt;

&lt; III-10&gt;

( : %)

		10.8	14.1	8.1	$\chi^2 = 682.3$ p=0.001
3	-1	16.4	19.7	17.6	
1-5		40.3	38.7	34.3	
5-10		16.0	15.3	16.5	
10		16.5	12.2	23.5	
1		44.6	41.7	42.0	$\chi^2 = 59.0$ p=0.001
1-6		39.8	43.2	42.2	
6	-1	9.1	9.6	9.2	
1		6.5	5.5	6.6	
		51.0	53.2	40.2	$\chi^2 = 700.7$ p=0.001
		5.4	4.6	6.3	
		7.7	9.6	10.3	
		35.9	32.6	43.2	

가

. Gottschalk(1978)

Rumberger(1987)

가

( )

( )

가

Throuw

(job)

. &lt; III-11&gt;

. &lt; III-3&gt;

가

. 50

가

30 -499

가

가

.

. 2 4

&lt; III-11&gt;

( : )

		8,527	8,944	8,848	6,978
		9,543	9,952	9,586	8,315
		5,668	6,082	5,894	4,797
	20	3,732	3,756	3,985	3,430
	21-25	5,138	5,050	5,214	5,210
	26-30	7,165	7,249	7,189	6,714
	31-35	9,168	9,291	9,309	8,043
	36-40	10,155	10,338	10,686	8,403
	41-45	10,612	11,051	11,924	8,203
	46-50	10,302	11,299	12,194	7,743
	51-55	9,925	11,911	11,863	7,027
	56	8,638	12,426	9,902	4,847
		5,416	5,318	-	5,417
		6,180	6,181	5,806	6,188
		7,054	7,043	6,405	8,417
		7,976	8,314	7,698	8,303
		12,320	13,417	11,384	-
	10-29	6,423	6,506	6,952	5,702
	30-99	6,821	7,338	6,895	5,817
	100-299	7,735	8,252	7,839	6,425
	300-499	8,557	9,076	8,603	7,134
	500-999	9,565	9,883	9,992	7,845
		8,979	8,578	9,682	9,007
		7,590	7,640	8,103	6,568
	가	9,547	9,381	9,685	9,693
		9,566	9,442	10,164	8,713
	,	7,953	7,707	8,206	7,861
		9,196	9,543	10,806	5,740
		11,453	13,306	9,082	7,304
		10,683	9,854	11,878	9,068
		12,099	12,591	12,885	9,344
		7,821	7,026	8,822	6,234
		9,947	9,956	8,198	10,574
		6,426	6,489	6,672	6,022

가

&lt; III-12&gt;

	1.7 (39.5)	0.4 (9.2)	3.4 (51.3)
	78.9 (37.3)	96.7 (44.8)	59.2 (17.9)
	19.4 (42.0)	2.9 (6.2)	37.4 (51.8)
(%)	100.0	100.0	100.0

: ( )

가 &lt;

III-13&gt;

가

&lt; III-12&gt;

가

51.8% 45.5%

&lt; III-13&gt;

	2.9 (49.4)	0.6 (8.4)	4.0 (42.2)
	75.3 (38.2)	95.5 (42.0)	62.4 (19.8)
	21.8 (47.2)	3.9 (7.3)	33.6 (45.5)
(%)	100.0	100.0	100.0

: ( )

## 5.

가

가.

Sicherman(1991),

Duncan and Hartog and Oosterbeek(1988), Alba-Ramirez(1993)

(1)

가  
 ( )  
 ( ) 가  
 가

$$\ln(w) = \alpha + X\beta + \phi_0 E^r + \phi_1 E^o + \phi_2 E^u + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

$E^r$ ,  $E^o$ ,  $E^u$   
 E ln(w)

$\phi_0$   $\phi_1$   
 가  
 ,  $\phi_2$

(2)

$$E = E^r + E^o - E^u$$

$$E^o = E - E^r \text{ if } E \geq 0; E^o = 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

(2)

$$E^u = E^r - E \text{ if } E^r \geq 0; E^u = 0 \text{ otherwise}$$

(1) (2)  $\phi_0 = \phi_1$

가  $\phi_0 = -\phi_2$

가 가 (Hypothesis)

가 &lt; III-14&gt;

가

가 가

(1) (2)

11%

13%,

10%,

-7%

(2) (4)

2.7%

3%

5.8%

5.9%

( )

( )

가

( )

가  $\phi_0 = \phi_1$

$\phi_0 = -\phi_2$  F

0.001%

가

가

&lt; III-14&gt;

	1		2		3		4	
	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )	( )
	8.058***	(0.0119)	7.727***	(0.0120)	7.824***	(0.0114)	7.477***	(0.01156)
( =1, =0)	0.204***	(0.0017)	0.2089***	(0.0017)	0.195***	(0.0016)	0.200***	(0.00159)
	0.059***	(0.0002)	0.0602***	(0.00021)	0.058***	(0.0002)	0.059***	(0.0002)
2	-0.001***	(0.000005)	-0.001***	(0.000005)	-0.001***	(0.000005)	-0.001***	(0.00005)
( =1 =0)	0.078***	(0.00081)	0.073***	(0.00079)	0.092***	(0.00078)	0.086***	(0.00076)
	-	-	-	-	0.102***	(0.00055)	0.105***	(0.00053)
	0.109***	(0.00031)	-	-	0.107***	(0.0003)	-	-
( )	-	-	0.1306***	(0.0005)	-	-	0.1298***	(0.00034)
( )	-	-	0.1035***	(0.00049)	-	-	0.0998***	(0.00047)
( )	-	-	-0.0722***	(0.00058)	-	-	-0.0704** *	(0.00055)
R2	0.471		0.489		0.515		0.535	
	383,308		383,308		383,308		383,308	

96 98

가 &lt; III-15&gt; . IMF

98 96 , 97

3

가

&lt; III-15&gt;

( : %)

	(2)			(4)		
	96	97	98	96	97	98
( )	13.3	13.6	13.1	13.1	13.4	13.0
( )	10.4	10.8	10.4	10.1	10.4	10.0
( )	-7.7	-8.9	-7.2	-7.3	-8.6	-7.0
(total)	11.1	11.6	10.9	10.9	11.3	10.7

: &lt; III-12&gt; (1) (3)

.

가

. &lt; II-14&gt;

0.0271,

0.1757

가

&lt;

III-11&gt;

1

,

1,678,919 × 1

× 0.0271 × 8,944 × 12 =

9,982

가

가

&lt; III-16&gt;

( : )

		9,982	35,547
		8,847	24,422
		1,371	9,271
	20	100	632
	21-25	778	2,183
	26-30	1,886	3,111
	31-35	2,211	3,339
	36-40	2,004	5,544
	41-45	1,179	6,314
	46-50	646	6,281
	51-55	382	5,537
	56	312	7,856
		-	5,714
		27	8,564
		3,366	10,704
		1,633	3,666
		5,002	-
		14	287
		3,859	13,976
	가	95	478
		561	1,824
	,	2,210	4,867
		1,767	7,222
		587	3,786
		381	928
		2,689	11,628
		2,938	3,772
		4	71
		3,258	16,596

가

1998

4 6

1

3 5

3 3

가

1 1

가

5 가

1 1

가

가

가

가

(Logit)

III

가

0

1

&lt; III-17&gt;

	=0      =1	0.738
	=6,      =9,      =12,      =14, 16	12.768
		35.746
2	*	1381.25
	1=1-29 ,    2=30-99 ,    3=100-299 , 4=300-499 , 5=500-999	3.866
1(      )	1-3=1,      =0	0.304
2(      )	4-5=1,      =0	0.263
4(      )	6=1,      =0	0.431
	=1      =0	0.355
	=1      =0	0.195

가

7-9 ,

가  
가

가

가

가

&lt; III-18&gt;

			<b>oddratio</b>
	6.047 ***	0.101	-
	0.236 ***	0.009	1.266
	-0.042 ***	0.003	0.959
	-0.112 ***	0.002	0.894
2	0.0008 ***	0.00002	1.001
	-0.371 ***	0.003	0.690
1( )	-0.188 **	0.080	0.829
2( )	-0.465 ***	0.080	0.628
4( )	-0.076	0.080	0.926
	0.131 ***	0.009	1.140
	-0.165 ***	0.012	0.848
=247,950 , =383,456			
-2log L= 466785.6 CHI-SQUARE 31334.8***			

6.

가 ,

A 가 50%

, B

50%

< III-19 >

가

45.2%가

56.5%가

A 가

, B 가

30.0%

16.7%

가

< III-19 >

( :%)

A	45.2	24.8	30.0
B	56.5	16.8	16.7

&lt; III-20&gt;

438 33.1% 145  
62.1%

90

, 37.9% 55

293 52.2% 153  
47.8% 140

&lt; III-20&gt;

( : , %)

A	90(62.1)	55(37.9)	145(100.0)
B	153(52.2)	140(47.8)	293(100.0)
	243(55.9)	195(44.5)	438(100.0)

&lt; III-21&gt;

438 63.5% 278

10.7%

, 25.8% 113

가

가

,

&lt; III-21&gt;

( : , %)

	47	10.7
	278	63.5
	113	25.8
	438	100.0

&lt; III-22&gt;

&lt; III-22&gt;

( : %)

A	20.2	16.9	17.4
B	14.5	14.5	15.7

, 20.2% ,

14.5% 5.7%

, 16.9%, 14.5% 2.4%

, 17.4% 15.7% 1.7%

가 가

가

,

가

3D

3D



#### IV.

35.5% ,  
45.0%, 19.5% .  
30 ,  
, 30-40 가  
53.9% 가  
54.5% .  
가  
500 가  
10-29 가  
가  
,  
, , ,  
가  
가  
10 가  
6-10 가  
가

260  
가 190      가 70  
213  
가  
(turnover)

가

11%      13%,  
10%,  
-7%  
가

1998

4 6

1

3

5

가

가

가

가 가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

30),

,

60-70

80

가

가

가

(signal)

가

---

30)

가



(1998).

(1992).

(1982,1983), “ 가 I-II”. 『』,

(1993).

(1994). “ (I)”. 『』,

17 , 2 ,

(1997). 21

(2000). 가

(1991), 『』.

(1996). 『』,

(1999). (I).

(1996).

(1994).

(1992). “ ”. 『』

』 40 1 .

(1996). “ ”. 『』

』 19 .

(1999). “ ”. 『』 47

1 .

(1997).

( ) .

( ).

( ).

( ).

( ).

( ).

(1995).

Alfonso Alba-Ramirez(1993). Mismatch in the Spanish Labor Market -  
education? *The Journal of Human Resources*. Spring.

Cohn, E.(1979). *The Economics of Education*, Ballinger.

Hamermesh, Daniel S.(1974). *The Economics of job Satisfaction*, U.S.  
Department of Labor.

Eugene A. Kroch, Kriss Sjoblom(1994). Schooling as Human Capital or a  
Signal, *The Journal of Human Resources*. vol.26.

Mun C. Tsang et.al(1991). The Impact of Surplus Schooling on Worker  
Productivity, *Industrial Relation*. vol.30.

Mun. C. Tsang, Russell W. Schooling, and Henry. M. Levin(1991), "The  
Impact of surplus on worker productivity", *Industrial relations*, vol.  
30, no.2 spring.

Russell W. Rumberger(1991). The Impact of Surplus Schooling on  
Productivity and Earnings, *The Journal of Human Resources*. vol.22.

Sicherman(1991), "overeducation" in the labor market, *Journal of labor  
economic*. vol.9. no.2.

W. Norton Grubb(1993). The varied economic returns to postsecondary  
education -New evidence from the class of 1972, *The journal of  
human resources*. spring.

Wykstra, Ronald A.(1971). *Human Capital Formation*, The Free Press.

## **Abstract**

# **The Impact of overeducation on Labor Market in Korea**

Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education & Training

Research Director: Kim, Jooseop

Researcher : Lee, Sang-Jun

The purpose of this study is to analyse the current status of overeducation, and to verify the social inefficiency by job mismatch. Also, we intended to make policy suggestions based on the analysis of this study.

In this study, we adapted three different methods. First, we used objective methods to grasp the current status of job mismatch. We merged the 「Occupational Workers Survey」 with 「Occupational Dictionary」 by occupation group, so that we could get the information on the degree of job match in Korea. Second, we performed firm survey to investigate firms' behavior for overeducated workers. Third, we performed empirical study to verify the impact overeducation on the labor market in Korea.

Employment elasticity by school attainment in Korea shows that more educated workers have higher employment elasticity, which means higher educated person have greater chance to be employed due to the economic growth.

The employment rate by school attainment is higher for the more educated workers. It is analysed that this trend has been formed by the demand side cause as well as by the supply side cause. In the demand side, Korea economy has been experienced rapid change of industrial structure to the more advanced one, so that more educated workers have been needed for sustainable economic growth. In the supply side, education policy in '1980's has led the oversupply of university and college graduates. Those two factors have led the overeducation in Korea, and higher employment rate of higher educated person.

The ratio of overeducation is revealed as 35.5%, just-education as 45.0%, and under-education as 19.5%, which shows consistent results with previous studies. And also, it is calculated that more than 4 trillion won is wasting annually due to the mismatch.

Several policy implications are suggested as follows;

First, Vitalization of internal labor market is desirable. More in-plant training have to be encouraged, and job transfer within firm should be utilized.

Second, recruit system should be changed. The collective recruit system mainly in large firms in Korea has been a major cause of producing overeducation. More flexible recruit system can reduce inefficiency from job mismatch.

Third, flexible labor supply of higher educated workers is necessary. This means that the quantity and quality of graduates from education market should correspond to the demand of labor market.